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5  The importance of sanctity or freedom of contract194
Although courts have acknowledged that they have a duty to impugn contrac-
tual provisions that are against public policy in order to promote “simple justice 
between man and man”,195 they have also remained cautious of public policy:
“Public policy in the interpretation of contracts has, for some reason, inspired a shower of equine 
analogies. It has been variously described as a very unruly horse, a high horse to mount and difficult 
to ride, one which stampedes in opposite directions at the same time and one whose reins must be 
tightly held”.196
They have confirmed that “public policy generally favours the utmost free-
dom of contract”197 and that:
“The power to declare contracts contrary to public policy should, however, be exercised sparingly 
and only in the clearest of cases, lest uncertainty as to the validity of contracts result from an arbitrary 
and indiscriminate use of the power. One must be careful not to conclude that a contract is contrary to 
public policy merely because its terms (or some of them) offend one’s individual sense of propriety 
and fairness”.198
* I gratefully acknowledge the valuable advice of Andre van der Walt, Lourens du Plessis, Durand Cupido 
and the anonymous reviewers
94 The judges in this matter seem to use the terms sanctity of contract and freedom of contract interchange-
ably  It is doubtful whether this is correct  But nothing more will be made of it in this contribution  
95 Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537 544
96 See Interland Durban (Pty) Ltd v Walters NO 1993 1 SA 223 (A) 224-225 and the analysis of the criticism 
of Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A)
97 Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A) 9
98 8-9  See also Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) para 8; Barnard v Barnard 2000 3 
SA 741 (C) para 40; Botha (now Griessel) v Finanscredit (Pty) Ltd 1989 3 SA 773 (A) 782-783; Brisley 
v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 31; Brummer v Gorfil Brothers Investments (Pty) Ltd 1999 2 SA 389 
(SCA) 403; Citibank NA South African Branch v Paul 2003 4 SA 180 (T) 195; De Beer v Keyser 2002 1 
SA 827 (SCA) para 22; De Jager v Absa Bank Bpk 2001 3 SA 537 (SCA) para 14; De Klerk v Old Mutual 
Insurance Ltd 1990 3 SA 34 (E) 43-44; Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd v Singh 2004 3 SA 630 (D) 657-658; Eerste 
Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman 1997 4 SA 302 (SCA) 324; First National Bank of SA 
Ltd v Bophuthatswana Consumer Affairs Council 1995 2 SA 853 (BG) 870-871; Joosub Investments (Pty) 
Ltd v Maritime & General Insurance Co Ltd 1990 3 SA 373 (C) 385-386; Mufamadi v Dorbyl Finance 
(Pty) Ltd 1996 1 SA 799 (A) 803-804; Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v National Potato Co-operative Ltd 
2004 6 SA 66 (SCA) para 23; Society of Lloyd’s v Romakin 2006 4 SA 23 (C) paras 99, 109; Standard Bank 
of SA Ltd v Essop 1997 4 SA 569 (D) 575-576; Traco Marketing (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner South African 
Revenue Services: In re Commissioner South African Revenue Services v Traco Marketing (Pty) Ltd 1998 
4 SA 1002 (SE) 1012; Venter v Credit Guarantee Insurance Corporation of Africa Ltd 1996 3 SA 966 (A) 
976-977; Warrenton Munisipaliteit v Coetzee 1998 3 SA 1103 (NC) 1112
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the Supreme Court of Appeal counsel for the insured relied on the 
constitutional values of “dignity, equality and the advancements of human 
rights and freedoms” as described in section 1 of the Constitution, to have 
the time limitation struck down for being inconsistent with public policy.199 
However, Cameron JA allowed a narrow field of application for such a 
review of contractual provisions. He stated that these values do not provide a 
“general all-embracing touchstone for invalidating a contract”.200 He stressed 
the importance of freedom of contract as a constitutional counter-value and 
observed that this principle was itself rooted in freedom and dignity.201 Judges 
have to take care not to impose their conceptions of fairness and justice on 
arrangements that were apparently concluded voluntarily. Constitutional 
values had to be employed only to strike down the “unacceptable excesses of 
freedom of contract”.202
Cameron JA mentioned that it is “easy to see how the Constitution’s founda-
tional values of non-racialism and non-sexism could lead to the invalidation of 
a contractual term”.203 He then continued that a far more complicated balanc-
ing act was necessary for determining whether a clause could be impugned 
on the basis of dignity, equality and the advancement of human rights and 
freedoms, as dignity and autonomy also formed the justification for the prin-
ciple of freedom of contract.204 Cameron JA’s argument seems to have been 
that non-racialism and non-sexism, unlike autonomy and dignity, do not fulfil 
the dual role of also forming the foundation for freedom of contract. But his 
argument paints the picture with rather broad strokes. The judge followed a 
classic liberal interpretation of the concepts freedom and dignity. It is doubt-
ful whether it is historically, politically and therefore legally acceptable to 
endorse such a construction. Equality should serve as a more important “vehi-
cle to facilitate transformation” in an unequal society such as South Africa.205 
Dignity also should be a “constraint-based” rather than an “empowerment-
based” liberal concept in this society that still struggles to deal with the 
legacies of apartheid.206 Cameron JA’s narrow reliance on the foundational 
principles of the Constitution in order to give content to public policy further 
skews public policy in favour of sanctity of contract.207 A more sophisticated 
textual treatment of the specific provisions of the Bill of Rights was called for. 
It is doubted whether the special role which Cameron JA ascribed to freedom 
199 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 11  See also Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 94, 
Lubbe 2004 SALJ 414-415; Price Waterhouse Coopers Inc v National Potato Co-operative Ltd 2004 6 SA 
66 (SCA) para 44
200 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 11
201 Paras 11-14  See also Bhana 2007 SALJ 271-272; Naude & Lubbe 2005 SALJ 443
202 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 13  See also para 7 and the rejection of the striking down of 
contractual provisions on imprecise notions such as good faith
203 Para 14  See generally text next to n 240 below  See also Sachs J in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 
(CC) para 182 and his analysis of profiling and stereotyping, discussed in the text next to n 268 below
204 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) paras 11-16
205 Bhana 2007 SALJ 274
206 273-275 (it is doubted whether Bhana is correct in concluding that this is more conservative than the 
pre-Constitutional approach to contracts against public policy)  See further Bhana & Pieterse “Towards a 
Reconciliation of Contract Law and Constitutional Values: Brisley and Afrox Revisited” 2005 SALJ 865 
879-881; Lubbe 2004 SALJ 420-422; Naude & Lubbe 2005 SALJ 452
207 See text next to n 102 above
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of contract can be justified in the light of the absence of any explicit reference 
to it in the detailed provisions of the Bill of Rights.
Nominally Ngcobo J in the Constitutional Court agreed with the Supreme 
Court of Appeal on the significance of sanctity of contract.208 He again made 
several references to the importance of freedom of contract or pacta sunt 
servanda.209 He observed that this principle gives effect to the constitutional 
values of freedom and dignity:
“Self-autonomy or the ability to regulate one’s own affairs, even to one’s own detriment, is the very 
essence of freedom and a vital part of dignity”.210
It was further recognised that pacta sunt servanda is a “profoundly moral 
principle, on which the coherence of any society relies”,211 and that reli-
ance should be placed on the concept, although this reliance should not be 
“blind”.212
nevertheless, it is clear from his more specific description of public policy, 
that Ngcobo J subtly changed tack in favour of a more restricted perspective of 
the principle of sanctity of contract. The differences should not be exaggerated. 
Ngcobo J correctly observed that the Supreme Court of Appeal in this case did 
not regard pacta sunt servanda as a holy cow that could never be slaughtered 
in order to give effect to the Constitution.213 However, Ngcobo J also accorded 
greater priority than the Supreme Court of Appeal to other values, and 
especially fairness, as significant checks on freedom of contract.214
The dissenting judges went even further. Moseneke DCJ explicitly envis-
aged a narrower scope for sanctity of contract. He stated that it is trite that 
“constitutional values allow individuals the dignity and freedom to regulate 
their affairs”215 but that bargains, even if freely struck, could not be inimi-
cal to equity and fairness as sourced from the Constitution. He criticized the 
extolling of the virtues of laissez faire freedom of contract at the expense of 
public notions of reasonableness and fairness.216
For Sachs J this case raised the question whether the need to protect 
consumers required that received concepts of sanctity of contract should be 
revisited217 or whether received notions of contract law as encapsulated in 
the principle of sanctity of contract are inviolate and unchanging.218 He did 
more than any other judge who sat on this matter to explain the purpose and 
function of the principle of sanctity of contract.219 He quoted from the judg-
208 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 57, 70
209 Paras 55, 57, 70, 73
210 Para 57
211 Para 87
212 Para 55
213 Para 15
214 See especially paras 72-73  See also the judgment of Moseneke DCJ para 104  See further 4 above on the 
role of reasonableness and 6 2 1 below  
215 Para 104
216 Para 104
217 Para 123
218 Para 150
219 See Christie The Law of Contract (2006) 12, 14-15 and Van der Merwe et al Contract 11-12, 20-21 on 
freedom of contract and the reasons for its existence
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ment of Davis J in Mort v Henry Shields-Chiat220 where that judge stated that 
the constitutional principle of freedom, to some extent, supported contractual 
autonomy: failure to do so would cause contractual litigation to mushroom 
and it would defeat the expectations of the parties.221 Yet, equality and dignity 
direct attention in another direction. Parties to a contract in the constitutional 
era have to adhere to a minimum threshold of mutual respect. One-sided pro-
motion of personal interests would therefore constitute a breach of the duty 
to act in good faith.222 The law of contract had to be developed to ensure 
that it reflected these constitutional values.223 Sachs J noted that sanctity of 
contract and the maxim pacta sunt servanda had become “axiomatic, indeed 
mesmeric” through judicial and textbook repetition. Freedom of contract is 
defined in terms of a separation of the market and state, private and public law. 
At its fullest reach it is the doctrine of laissez faire.224 However, the importance 
of these principles is not self-evident and they have become severely restricted 
in open and democratic societies. Sanctity of contract has been removed from 
the “pedestal on which it once imperiously stood”.225 The state now has a 
greater interest in the regulation of private relationships and in ensuring fair-
ness and equity.226 This development took place through consumer protection 
struggles, scholarly critiques, legislative intervention and creative judicial 
reasoning. The new constitutional order also attenuates sanctity of contract’s 
once implacable position.227
It is perhaps an exaggeration to state that sanctity of contract has ever been 
regarded as absolute. It is not surprising that Sachs J made this statement with-
out referring to any examples from local textbooks or case law.228 However, 
his broad conclusion is correct: the importance of sanctity of contract has 
often been overstated in South Africa. The time is ripe to reconsider this prin-
ciple against the backdrop of the Constitution, the importance of the state in 
the regulation of the economy and the need for consumer protection.229
220 2001 1 SA 464 (C) 474-475, also cited by Olivier JA in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA)
221 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 168, 171-172  See also the reference to the Law Reform 
Commission of Hong Kong Report on Sale of Goods and Supply of Services Topic 21 (1990) where the 
role played by sanctity of contract in creating certainty and the limits of this argument was discussed and 
the analysis and evaluation of the same argument by the South African Law Commission  
222 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 165, 167, 335-336  On the role of good faith see the text 
next to n 179 above and text next to n 365 below
223 Para 140
224 Para 145
225 Para 141, 162-163
226 Para 154  See also para 170 where it was mentioned that a balance has to be struck between freedom 
of contract and the control of private volition in the interest of public policy, but see the more accurate 
approach in para 174 where individual volition is contrasted with a reconciliation of the interests of the 
parties  Christie The Law of Contract 15 (2006) calls this a “paternalistic” attitude
227 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 141
228 See paras 151-154 especially n 26 where reliance was placed on Collins The Law of Contract 3 ed (1997) 
v-vi although his views are generally considered to be quite extreme  See also paras 158-160 where it was 
accepted that courts have placed some limitations on the operation of sanctity of contract
229 This approach has already garnered strong academic support  See for example, the sources mentioned in 
5 above and the academic outcry after Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) mentioned in 
Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 8 n 4
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6  The determination of fairness of a time-limitation
It now remains to look more closely at the manner in which the different 
courts in Napier determined whether the time-limitation was fair and what 
this means for time-limitations and other unfair provisions.
6 1  Fairness before the High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal
The court of first instance directly tested the time-limitation against the 
constitutional right set out in section 34 of the Constitution. It could therefore 
apply the reasoning of the Mohlomi case,230 where a statutory time-limitation 
was found to conflict with the Constitution, in its pure form. de villiers J 
concluded that the time limitation was unfair.231
In the Supreme Court of Appeal, Cameron JA decided that the Mohlomi 
test was not applicable in this contractual context. However, in answering his 
first broad question, regarding the extent to which the Constitution generally 
applied between contracting parties, he considered whether the time limita-
tion was contrary to public policy by reference to a further two-stage test.
First he asked whether the provision was unfair or unreasonable. He con-
cluded that the unfairness of the time limitation was not self-evident and that 
there was no warrant for such a conclusion on the evidence before court.232 
The statement of facts did not generate sufficient evidence that could persuade 
the court that the time limitation was unfair. The time limitation meant that 
the insured lost his claim within a much shorter time than the ordinary periods 
of prescription, but in insurance cases details of the claim and the incident that 
caused it are usually uniquely within the claimant’s knowledge. This would 
justify a shorter limitation period for an insurance claim. The reasonableness 
of the period would amongst others depend on the number of claims the insurer 
has to deal with, how its claim procedures work, what resources the insurer 
has to investigate and process claims, and what premiums it charges.233
Secondly, Cameron JA referred to Brisley v Drotsky234 as support for the 
view that the mere unfairness or harshness of a provision did not mean that 
it offended against constitutional principles.235 Although he acknowledged 
that the judgment was controversial, he relied on Afrox Healthcare Bpk v 
Strydom236 where it was decided that equality of bargaining power could prove 
decisive in these situations. To determine relative bargaining power, evidence 
is required regarding a number of issues, such as the market for short-term 
insurance products; the variety of these products that is available; the concen-
tration levels in the market for these products; whether all or most insurers 
impose these restrictions; the variety of time limitations that is available to 
230 Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 1997 1 SA 124 (CC) See text next to nn 176-178 above and 6 2 below
231 Barkhuizen v Napier TPD 17-09-2004 case no 33129/01 10-13; Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) 
para 10; Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 9
232 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) paras 9-10
233 Bhana 2007 SALJ 277-278 rightly asks why the court did not equally take note of factors favouring the 
insured
234 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 95
235 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 12
236 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA)
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insured parties and the range over which they fall; and whether short-term 
insurance was an essential or optional convenience for an apparently affluent 
middle-class person such as the insured or was an optional convenience. But, 
as there was no evidence of inequality of bargaining power before the court, 
this constitutional challenge could not “even get off the ground”.237
The Supreme Court of Appeal stressed the importance of relative bargain-
ing power in determining the significance of the Constitutional principles of 
dignity, equality and the promotion of human rights and freedoms for con-
tractual outcomes.238 Generally, both the court’s understanding of the concept 
of bargaining power239 and the role that was ascribed to it are problematic. In 
particular, the relative bargaining position of the parties was not envisaged to 
carry the same significance in cases that concern contractual provisions that 
offend against the principles of non-sexism and non-racism. The conclusion 
that a racist provision in a contract concluded between parties of equal bar-
gaining should be struck down without reference to bargaining power, while 
one that is economically unfair to one of the parties should not, is justifiable. 
Yet, a more sophisticated basis for distinguishing these situations is called 
for.240
6 2  Fairness in the Constitutional Court
Ngcobo J determined whether the contractual time limitation had to be 
struck down with reference to the two reasons given in the Mohlomi case for 
striking down a statutory time limitation.241 First, it had to be established 
whether the clause itself was reasonable. Thereafter, even if it was reasonable, 
it had to be established whether the clause should be enforced in particular 
circumstances which prevented compliance with the time-limitation clause.242 
Moseneke DCJ also applied the reasoning of the Mohlomi case, but he followed 
the formulation in that case more closely. His second enquiry was addressed 
to the question whether the clause was unfair because it was inflexible or 
required strict compliance in all circumstances.243
6 2 1  Ngcobo J’s first enquiry: fairness of the clause
ngcobo J bifurcated his first enquiry. First, it had to be determined whether 
the objective terms of the contract, on their face, were inconsistent with public 
policy. Some time-limitation clauses are so unreasonable that their unfairness 
is “manifest”. As an example the judge mentioned a provision determin-
ing that a claim had to be instituted within 24 hours of the occurrence of a 
risk. No further information would be required to show that such a clause is 
237 Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) paras 8, 14-16  See the cogent criticism of Bhana 2007 SALJ 
276
238 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 14  See Bhana 2007 SALJ 271-272
239 See the analysis of standard-form contracts in 6 2 3 below
240 See text next to nn 203-207 above where this distinction is explained
241 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 50-52, with reference to Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 
1997 1 SA 124 (CC) paras 13-14  See also text next to nn 163-164, 215 above
242 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 56-58
243 Para 109  Moseneke DCJ called it the Mohlomi test although it was not formulated as a test in that case
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unreasonable.244 There could also be other cases where a restriction would 
be tantamount to denial of access to court.245 But he then decided that in this 
case, the 90 days limitation was not manifestly unreasonable. It only started to 
run once a claim had been repudiated. At this stage the insured would already 
have sufficient information about the claim to allow him or his attorney to 
issue summons within the restricted time.246
According to the second part of the first enquiry, it then had to be determined 
whether the term was contrary to public policy in the light of the relative situation 
of the contracting parties. In addressing this second question, Ngcobo J stressed 
the importance of the relative bargaining power of the contracting parties:
“Indeed, many people in this country conclude contracts without any bargaining power and without 
understanding what they are agreeing to. That will often be a relevant consideration in determining 
fairness.”247
However, there was no admissible evidence that the contract was not freely 
concluded, that the parties were in an unequal bargaining position, or that the 
clause was not drawn to the attention of the insured.248
The first enquiry as put forward by ngcobo J constitutes a considerable 
shift in this area of the law. The Supreme Court of Appeal indicated that proof 
of inequality of bargaining power is a core requirement for striking a con-
tract down on the basis of fairness. In the Constitutional Court it was merely 
viewed as an additional requirement once it was found that the objective terms 
were not on their face unreasonable:249
“if a court finds that a time-limitation clause does not afford a contracting party a reasonable and fair 
opportunity to approach a court it will declare it to be contrary to public policy and therefore invalid. 
To the extent that the Supreme Court of Appeal appears to have held otherwise, that dictum cannot 
be supported”.250
In this respect the judgment of the majority in the Constitutional Court is a 
vast improvement on the outdated approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal. 
However, the judgment of Ngcobo J also raises some uncomfortable questions.
First, this part of the judgment is badly organized and difficult to follow. 
It is not always clear when the court is dealing with the first part of the first 
enquiry, the second part of the first enquiry discussed in this section, or the 
second enquiry analyzed in the next section.251
244 Paras 59-62
245 Para 60
246 Para 63
247 Para 65
248 Paras 59, 64-66  The courts have followed a similar approach in other cases  See Lubbe 2004 SALJ 416
249 Para 59
250 Para 72  Although this statement is made in the context of the second enquiry (which is discussed in 6 2 
5 below), it does not appear to be restricted to it  See also Woolman 2007 SALJ 772 who over-simplifies 
these issues
251 It is not clear why the considerations mentioned in para 57 of Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) 
were referred to only in the context of the first enquiry  It is also not clear whether para 60 was intended to 
apply to one or both parts of the first enquiry  Para 62 seems out of place in so far as it refers to the second 
enquiry  The heading before para 62 and para 67 creates the impression that this section applies only to 
the first part of the first enquiry, but it actually concerns both parts  See also the comments about para 72 
in n 235 above
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Secondly, the judge initially merely required that the time-limitation be 
unreasonable before it would be impugned. Later on he added that the unrea-
sonableness had to be “manifest”.252 Moreover, it is not clear whether this was 
merely required in terms of the first part of the first enquiry, or whether the 
yardstick will always be “manifest” unreasonableness or unfairness.253 There 
are good grounds for arguing that it generally should not be enough to show 
that a contractual provision is unreasonable but that manifest unreasonable-
ness has to be proved.254 The striking down of a contractual provision, after 
all, should be the exception rather than the rule.255 There may be reasons for 
applying a more lenient test where other facts indicate that this should be the 
case, for instance where a standard-form provision is the subject of a dispute, 
but this can be accommodated under the second leg of the first enquiry.256
Thirdly, it seems that the test requires that the fairness of a provision on 
the first leg has to be evaluated without any reference to evidence. The court 
stated that the contract had to be evaluated “on its face” and it did not refer 
to evidence in concluding that the clause did not comply with this test.257 
Evidence is considered only in order to answer the second question. However, 
it is not clear why this should be so. The judgment should rather be read to 
allow for a wider consideration of evidence.
Fourthly, the court stated that the “relative situation of the parties” must be 
evaluated.258 It is not quite clear what this means. The court only considered 
inequality of bargaining power under this rubric but perhaps other aspects can 
also be considered here.
Finally, Ngcobo J’s evaluation of relative bargaining power is 
superficial.259
Perhaps a differently formulated test is called for. First, it should be asked 
whether the clause is manifestly unreasonable on the face of it. Second, it 
should be determined whether there is evidence that shows either that it is 
manifestly unreasonable or that it should not be upheld on the basis of unfair-
ness for other reasons such as inequality of bargaining power.
6 2 2  the purported objective approach of the minority and role of 
bargaining power
Sachs J accepted that it was not necessary for the insured to show that the 
restriction operated unfairly against him (although he did not clearly distin-
252 In para 60 it is implied that the reasonableness test will be very strictly applied
253 The term “manifest” is used only in the context of the first part of the enquiry, but it is mentioned in the 
heading of the part of the judgment where both are analyzed, and it is used in para 67 with reference to 
both  The term was possibly introduced by counsel (see para 49)
254 But cf paras 70-71 where the court merely spoke of unreasonableness
255 Christie The Law of Contract (2006) 14-15 with reference to the proposals of the Law Commission  See 
6 2 3 below, especially text next to nn 316-317  Thus far courts have only been prepared to strike down 
contracts on the basis of public policy in cases of clear and manifest unfairness (see text next to n 180 
above)  
256 See the last part of this section
257 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 59
258 Para 59
259 Discussed in 6 2 2 below  See also Hawthorne 2004 THRHR 299-300 and the criticism of a similar strat-
egy in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) by Naude & Lubbe 2005 SALJ 461
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guish the issues that had to be investigated in determining the reasonableness 
of the time-limitation). The question was whether, objectively speaking, the 
time-limitation was consistent with public policy.260 Contractual fairness in 
the light of the Constitution required a special investigation of the provenance 
of the time bar. It had to be determined whether the fairness which public 
policy demanded at all permitted the enforcement of the time-limitation.261
This perspective formed the core of Moseneke DCJ’s disagreement with the 
majority. He criticized the majority judgment for determining “the consistency 
of a contractual term with public policy … by reference to the circumstances 
and conduct of the parties to the contract”.262 Public policy should ordinarily 
not be determined with reference to the personal attributes of the party seeking 
to escape the results of the time bar but by means of an “objective assessment 
of the terms of the bargain”.263 It is the “likely impact”264 or “tendency”265 of 
an impugned provision that should be determinative of public policy notions 
of fairness. The “subjective approach” of the majority meant that the same 
provision could be good or bad depending on the parties to the contract. This 
would render the reasonableness standard of public policy whimsical.266 If a 
complaint that a contractual provision is inconsistent with public policy could 
be defeated on the basis that it was not unfair to a particular contracting party, 
it would elevate laissez faire freedom of contract at the expense of public 
policy:267
“While there is often merit in contextual analysis, it is clear that contractual terms should not be tested 
for their consistency to public norms by merely observing the peculiar situation of the contracting 
parties. The enquiry must rather focus on the arrangement that the stipulation contemplates, on its 
impact on the parties, whoever they may be, on its tendency or likely outcome and ultimately, on its 
fairness between the parties as measured against public notions of fairness.”268
Moseneke DCJ exaggerated the extent to which the majority found support 
in so-called subjective factors.269 The Deputy Chief Justice relied on the state-
ment in the majority judgment that fairness has to be “assessed by reference 
to circumstances of the applicant”.270 This statement is widely formulated, but 
the majority probably only intended this phrase to refer to the relative bargain-
ing positions of the parties to the contract. Moseneke DCJ continued:
“This preferred subjective yardstick has prompted a fulsome enquiry into: (a) whether the applicant 
is poor or illiterate; (b) whether he was unaware of his rights; (c) whether he had access to profes-
sional advice; and (d) whether he was impeded by financial, educational or geographical reasons from 
260 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 122 and see paras 161, 183
261 Para 124
262 Para 94
263 Para 96
264 Para 97
265 Para 98  See also paras 99-103 with reference to Bafana Finance Mabopane v Makwakwa 2006 4 SA 581 
(SCA); Donelly v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1995 2 SA 1 (A); Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A); 
Ex parte Minister of Justice: In re Nedbank Ltd v Abstein Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1995 3 SA 1 (A); Standard 
Bank of SA Ltd v Wilkinson 1993 2 SA 822 (C)
266 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 98  But see para 148 n 18 per Sachs J who apparently did 
not regard this as a problem (discussed in the text after nn 292, 295, and especially n 313 below)
267 Para 104
268 Para 104 (own emphasis)
269 Para 94
270 Para 64
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meeting the deadline set by the time bar. In the same vein, much has been made of the fact that he is a 
software developer and drives a new BMW 328i, which in the words of the Supreme Court of Appeal 
is ‘a vehicle seemingly appurtenant to a reasonably affluent middle-class lifestyle’. The majority 
judgment also notes that the applicant lodged his claim with the insurance company promptly after 
the motor collision that saw his motor vehicle damaged beyond repair, thereby implying that he could 
have issued summons well within the 90-day prescriptive period. In effect, the applicant’s personal 
attributes and station in life played a decisive role in the determination of the majority judgment that 
the time bar clause is fair and just and thus accords with public policy.”271
This misstates the extent to which the majority relied on the personal cir-
cumstances of the insured. The fact that the insured was a software developer 
who drove a BmW and that the claim was notified to the insurer well within 
another time limit was mentioned in the majority’s summary of facts.272 The 
employment of the insured and nature of the vehicle driven by him then played 
no further role in the judgment. The point regarding the speed with which 
written notice was given, was later repeated.273 However, the majority did not 
thereby imply that the insured “could have issued summons well within the 
90-day prescriptive period”.274 It referred to this fact as an “indication” that 
the insured was informed and not in an unequal bargaining position.275
Furthermore, moseneke dCJ seems to have overlooked the first part of the 
first enquiry proposed by the majority, when he concluded that the majority 
had merely looked at subjective factors.276 The Supreme Court of Appeal 
certainly followed a very subjective approach, but the majority judgment in 
the Constitutional Court is more sophisticated. Relative bargaining position 
is regarded as relevant, and not conclusive. It is only considered once it is 
concluded that the objective terms of the contract are not unreasonable on their 
face.277 The broader “circumstances that prevented compliance” in the specific 
case was perceived to be relevant only as part of the second enquiry.278
The judgments of the majority and minority therefore are not far apart on 
this point. moseneke dCJ, in terms that echo the first part of the first enquiry 
proposed by the majority, finally concluded that the time limitation was “on its 
face unreasonable or unjust”.279 He only emphasized that the relative position 
of the parties would not “ordinarily” be relevant and later mentioned that there 
is often merit in contextual analysis.280 Sachs J simply stated that fairness 
could not just be determined with reference to the position of the particular 
insured.281
271 Para 95 with reference to Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 15
272 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 2  See also the comment about the Supreme Court of 
Appeal judgment in para 14
273 Para 66
274 Para 95
275 Para 66
276 Para 104  It appears that a similar point is made by Sachs J in para 124
277 Para 59
278 Paras 58, 69  However, the broader “circumstances of the parties” was also used in the analysis of relative 
bargaining power (para 64) but see the discussion in the text just before n 259 above
279 Para 119
280 Paras 96, 97, 104
281 Para 124
BARHuIZEn v nAPIER 59
In the first instance, inequality of bargaining power is relevant to the ques-
tion whether a particular contract was properly concluded.282 Nevertheless, 
relative bargaining power also ought to be an indicator of the fairness or unfair-
ness of a contractual term. It is unlikely that a party who is truly in an equal 
bargaining situation will accept terms that are unfair. Evidence that a party 
in an equal bargaining position accepted a particular term should therefore be 
relevant whether the parties to the case before court were in such a position or 
not. This, at least in part, is what Sachs J meant with the “provenance” of the 
time-limitation clause.
However, the elements of equal bargaining power should be carefully estab-
lished. It will appear from the analysis of standard-form contracts283 that various 
requirements have to be met before it can be concluded that parties truly are in an 
equal bargaining position and that it will not be necessary to establish whether 
there is equality of bargaining power on the facts of every case. Moseneke DCJ’s 
warnings that bargaining power should be relevant only in determining whether 
a provision will tend to be unreasonable and that bargaining power should be 
approached with considerable caution is therefore apposite.
The focus on objective facts allowed the minority to evaluate the time-
limitation within the context of the entire insurance contract and other ancillary 
documents “that provide valuable clues on the likely manner in which the 
insurance agreement was concluded”,284 and to regard this, together with the 
sparsely stated facts, as sufficient for the purpose of drawing firm conclusions 
about the acceptability of the time-limitation provision.285 It allowed the 
contractual documents to “speak for themselves”.286 This is a major point of 
distinction between the majority and minority, and in this respect the minority 
judgments are more credible.
6 2 3  the minority judgments and short-term insurance policies as 
standard-form contracts
For the minority, a full evaluation of the contractual setting served as a 
springboard to label the time-limitation a provision in a standard-form docu-
ment or contract of adhesion that was attached to, but did not form part of, the 
negotiated terms of the contract.287 Ngcobo J acquiesced in many of the com-
ments made by Sachs J concerning standard-form contracts, but he did not 
apply them to this matter on the basis that the tersely stated facts did not allow 
for it. This is the most disappointing aspect of his judgment. Both minority 
judgments show convincingly that a reference to the contractual documents 
provided sufficient fuel for such an evaluation. This failure of the majority has 
282 Christie The Law of Contract (2006) 14 accepts that the Constitution could help to develop this area of 
law
283 See 6 2 3 below
284 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 105
285 Paras 97, 105, 106, 110 per Moseneke DCJ (who found support in the judgment of Sachs J) and para 122ff 
per Sachs J
286 Para 124
287 Para 122 per Sachs J  The only discussion of this issue in the judgment of Moseneke DCJ is in paras 
107-108 with reference to Sachs J
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important consequences both in the particular case and for the law of contract 
and insurance law in general.
The issue of standard form contracts was the focal point around which Sachs 
J shaped his judgment.288 He drew a distinction between the major terms of a 
contract that are mostly negotiated and determined by market forces and the 
ancillary terms in standard form, or those terms that, like mount Everest, are 
just there.289 A standard-form contract is drafted in advance by the supplier of 
goods or services and is presented to the consumer on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. 
It contains the common stock of terms that will be heavily weighted in favour 
of the supplier. Consumers are often ignorant of these terms or at least unable 
to appreciate their import. They are drafted by lawyers in obscure language and 
are set out in fine print.290 It is impracticable for consumers to shop around or 
take legal advice on these terms. The cost in time and legal fees would simply 
not justify the effort. The cost to an insured of taking legal advice frequently 
will exceed the premium that has to be paid on the policy. Even those who 
read and understand the standard-form provisions will find it difficult to resist 
them.291 The difficulties regarding standard-term contracts therefore strike both 
the rich and sophisticated and the poor and uneducated consumer.292
Few could disagree with these observations about the nature of standard 
contracts. Perhaps the reasonable man of the nineteenth century would have 
thought it sensible to read and make sense of all terms of the contracts that 
he concluded. Yet, the lifestyle of the reasonable person of the 21st century is 
far too complex and full for that. As almost nobody would go to the effort of 
investigating the fine-print terms of a contract, no market for such terms exist, 
even for those who are so fastidious that they read and make sure that they 
understand their consumer contracts.293
Sachs J’s conclusion that the part of the insurance policy which contained 
the time limitation, called the certificate of insurance, was a standard form 
contract is also indisputable. Insurance companies compete on the level of 
cover, no-claim bonuses, and premiums but not on the small print.294 The 
terms on which the parties actually agreed, the negotiated part, which 
concerned the type of vehicle insured, the major circumstances under which 
cover was granted and the premium paid, were set out in a schedule separate 
from the certificate of insurance.295 This part of the insurance policy was on a 
288 See also the way in which this issue was analyzed by the Bophuthatswana court in National Bank of 
SA Ltd v Bophuthatswana Consumer Affairs Council 1995 2 SA 853 (BG) 871-872  The argument was 
adumbrated by Bhana 2007 SALJ 275
289 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 144, 156  See the discussion of this issue in paras 164-165 
with reference to UK law, and its application in para 180
290 The reasons for the use of small print are discussed in paras 147, 156, 182-183  See the attempt to address 
this in the Policyholder Protection Rules (Long-term Insurance) 2004 issued in terms of s 62 of the Long-
term Insurance Act 52 of 1998 r 6 1
291 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 135-136
292 Para 149  See the comments in paras 148 (especially n 18), 156 and 173 about businesspeople, although 
they may also conclude standard contracts as consumers  See also n 266 above and n 313 below
293 The evidence which Cameron JA required about the insurance market would therefore be irrelevant  
Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 15
294 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 144  See Bhana 2007 SALJ 275-276
295 See the distinction drawn by Sachs J in para 148 n 18  See also nn 266, 292 above
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different footing.296 The document was provided to the insured at a time when 
he was still considering cover.297 There was nothing intrinsically unreasonable 
in the determination of the premium on the basis of facts which the insurer 
thought was statistically or actuarially significant and no question of offensive 
stereotyping or profiling arose here.298 (The judge warned that these provisions 
will not be allowed if they constitute “offensive stereotyping or demeaning 
profiling” even if they are in a negotiated part of a contract and are themselves 
negotiated.299 Insurers should think seriously whether the practice of charging 
different premiums to males and females for specific types of insurance or for 
persons who live in traditionally white and black areas ought to be continued.)300 
But the certificate of insurance contained voluminous terms in fine print to 
which the insurer claimed copyright.301 It was not signed by the insured or 
drawn to his attention. Neither the schedule nor the correspondence between 
the parties referred to the certificate. The certificate merely determined that 
the insured, after receiving it, had to return it immediately if it was not in 
accordance with the application for insurance.302
Sachs J asked whether courts in the constitutional era were compelled 
to impugn onerous provisions in standard-form contracts.303 He answered 
this question by observing that consumers seldom consent to the terms of 
these contracts in any real sense,304 but that consumers such as insured par-
ties merely expect to receive reliable products and services on reasonable 
terms.305 The principle of sanctity of contract had to be put in its rightful 
place,306 especially in the context of these standard-form contracts307 where 
provisions often allowed product and service providers to exert unilateral 
power over consumers.308 If contractual terms are enforced in these situations 
despite the lack of true subjective consent, it undermines true volition and the 
296 Traditionally, policies were provided to insured parties only after conclusion of their insurance agree-
ments, but the General Code of Conduct for Authorized Financial Services Providers and Representatives 
2003 issued in terms of s 15 of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002, espe-
cially r 7 1 now makes this practically impossible  See 7 below  With regard to other problems regarding 
the traditional contracting methods in insurance law, see Constantia Insurance Co Ltd v Compusource 
(Pty) Ltd 2005 4 SA 345 (SCA) discussed by Sutherland & Cupido “Insurance Law” in 2005 Annual 
Survey of South African Law 507, 508  
297 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 127-129, 147, 182
298 Para 182
299 Para 182
300 Havenga “Equality in Insurance Law – the Impact of the Bill of Rights” 1997 SA Merc LJ 275
301 Although the judge, for somewhat different purposes, was at pains to show that smallness of print is not 
in itself significant (Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 182, 183)
302 Paras 130-134, 147, 180, 182-183  In fact, both the schedule and certificate were only signed by the insurer 
(paras 128, 138)  On the distinction between the schedule and certificate, see para 107 per Moseneke DCJ  
See also on the protection of shareholders against the signing of blank documents: the General Code of 
Conduct for Authorized Financial Services Providers and Representatives 2003 issued in terms of s 15 of 
the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002, r 7 2 and the Policyholder Protection 
Rules (Long-term Insurance) 2004 issued in terms of s 62 of the Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998, r 17 
and Policyholder Protection Rules (Short-term Insurance) 2004 issued in terms of s 55 of the Short-term 
Insurance Act 53 of 1998 r 7 6  See also 7 below for a discussion of statutory disclosures
303 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 123, 150
304 Paras 137-138
305 Para 136
306 See text next to nn 217-229 above
307 Para 145
308 Paras 145, 163
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concomitant values of dignity and autonomy.309 If judges refer to autonomy 
in this context it merely illustrates that their vision has “become so clouded 
by anachronistic doctrine as to prevent them from seeing objective reality”.310 
It treats mass-produced script as sanctified legal Scripture.311 The judge also 
added that such an approach would not promote the spirit of openness.312 It 
is difficult to see what standard-term contracts have to do with openness, but 
all other aspects of the argument are eloquent and persuasive. Although the 
judge did not say so expressly, the conclusion that a case involves a clause 
in a standard-form contract would negate a further need for determining the 
relative bargaining power of the parties. It would address what Ngcobo J saw 
as the second leg of his first enquiry.313
Conversely, all standard-form provisions cannot be struck down. They 
serve an important economic purpose. They reduce transaction costs and 
allow management of supplying firms to confine their risks and control the 
activities of subordinate sales staff.314 What is required is neither a blanket 
rejection nor an acceptance of all standard-form terms. But the terms of these 
contracts have to be scrutinized carefully.
Sachs J proposed that a principled approach, using objective criteria for 
weighing standard terms, must be followed. So what are those criteria? He 
purported to answer this question with reference to local and international 
academic responses,315 international practice316 and proposals for law reform 
309 Paras 150-157
310 Para 155
311 Para 156
312 Para 156
313 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 148 n 18  Commercial contracts would have to be 
treated differently although the description of the types of contracts that are included may be too wide  
Commercial entities of course also conclude standard contracts  See nn 266, 292, 295 above  See further 
the discussion of the position in the UK in para 165 n 41  See also Naude & Lubbe 2005 SALJ 460-461 who 
argue in favour of a strict dispensation, at least where it concerns the bodily integrity of the consumer
314 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 139
315 Aronstam Consumer Protection, Freedom of Contract and the Law (1979); Atiyah The Rise and Fall of 
Freedom of Contract (1979) 731-732 (although Sachs J referred to a 1985 edition, this is merely a reprint); 
Bhana & Pieterse 2005 SALJ 865; Collins The Law of Contract; Fridman The Law of Contract in Canada 
4 ed (1999) v (with reference to the very liberal comment of Maine Ancient Law: Its Connection with the 
Early History of Society and its Relation to Modern Ideas (1861) 140); Lewis “Fairness in South African 
Contract Law” 2003 SALJ 330; McQuoid-Mason “Consumer Law: the Need for Reform” 1989 THRHR 
32; Nassar Sanctity of Contracts Revisited: a Study in the Theory and Practice of Long-term International 
Commercial Transactions (1995) 167-168; Rakoff “Contracts of Adhesion: an Essay in Reconstruction” 
1983 Harvard L R 1173; Woolfrey “Consumer Protection — A new Jurisprudence in South Africa” (1989-
1990) 11 Obiter 109 at 119-20
316 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 164-168  The judge referred to the European Council 
directive on unfair Contract Terms 93/13/EEC oJ L 95/29 (5 April 1993); the Report of the English 
and Scottish Law Commissions Unfair Terms in Contracts LC 298 and SLC 199 (2005) (the summary 
of this report can be found in para 165 n 41); the Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly, UN 
department of International Economic and Social Affairs, A/RES/39/248 (1985); and the uK unfair 
Contract Terms Act 1977 and the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulation 1999  He also dis-
cussed the position in South American countries, especially the Mexican Consumer Protection Law of 
1975 and the Brazilian Consumer Protection Code 1990  He concluded his discussion with reference to 
the Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong Report on Sale of Goods and Supply of Services 37-38 quoted 
by the South African Law Commission Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts and the Rectification of 
Contracts Project 47 Report (1998) para 2 2 2 8  In a quote from the South African Law Commission 
Report reference was made also to several Continental European Countries and Australia (see para 163)
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in South Africa.317 However, the judge went beyond his professed aims and 
also did a comparative analysis of the previous question, which is whether 
oppressive standard-form clauses should be enforced and the more general 
question whether oppressive clauses can be impugned on the basis of public 
policy. Many of the sources surveyed, the academic work in particular, appear 
to be somewhat dated, while the judge placed too much emphasis on a single 
source, namely the South African Law Commission (now South African Law 
Reform Commission) Report, especially as this report has been gathering dust 
and has not been implemented by the legislator.318 However, the judgment 
hopefully will become an important and valuable resource in this area of law. 
The foreign authorities illustrate that the problems which confronted the court 
are universal,319 and that the traditional responses of South African courts to 
these difficulties are outmoded.320
Sachs J noted that the South African cases in which contractual provisions 
were impugned on the basis of public policy did not themselves indicate to 
what extent standard-form contracts raised public policy concerns.321 He 
mentioned several factors that were relevant to the evaluation of the time-
limitation provision in this case: the insured did not consent to the provision 
in any real sense, the insured’s attention was not drawn to the provision, the 
onerous time-limitation was imposed without any reciprocal benefit for the 
insured, and a reasonable person in the position of the insured could not have 
been expected to have been aware of the provision.322
It is implicit in the conclusion that a contractual provision is in standard-
form that the parties have not really agreed to its terms. It follows that there 
would be few further reason for evaluating whether the consumer has con-
sented to standard-form terms, unless the aim is either to determine the degree 
of ignorance about a contractual term or there are special facts that show that 
the parties actually consented the provision in the particular circumstances 
of the case.
Considerable weight was attached to the lack of disclosure. Sachs J ulti-
mately concluded that the time limitation “lies buried obscurely in the small 
print of an exceptionally long, dense and structurally inelegant certificate 
of insurance apparently sent on to the insured after negotiations had been 
completed”.323 The clause was not “highlighted in the text so as visually, and 
in keeping with internationally accepted standards of consumer protection, to 
bring the consequences of non-compliance to the attention of the insured”.324 
The policy did not oblige the insurer to inform the insured of the time-limita-
tion at repudiation.325
317 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 169 in which reference was made to the South African Law 
Commission Unreasonable Stipulations in Contracts
318 See n 317 above  See also Naude & Lubbe 2005 SALJ 441 on the effect of the report
319 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 162
320 See for example Diners Club SA (Pty) Ltd v Singh 2004 3 SA 630 (D)
321 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 161
322 Paras 147-148
323 Para 183
324 Para 183
325 Para 183  On the format of insurance policies, see text next to nn 294-302 above
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Yet, disclosures should be approached carefully. Perhaps evidence that a 
particular term was pertinently drawn to the attention of the insured could be 
relevant in determining whether it is not onerous.326 But the difficulty with 
disclosures should be borne in mind. Vast complicated disclosures, often a 
feature of insurance contracting, swamp insured parties with dense, incom-
prehensible information and do very little to protect them.327 Again, even those 
consumers who understand disclosures may have no choice but to accept the 
disclosed provisions for lack of a market in such terms.
The two most important issues in determining the fairness of a clause in 
a standard form contract then remain: reciprocity and reasonable expecta-
tion.328 It will have to be demonstrated that the insured has received some 
benefit in exchange for the time-limitation although it may be difficult to 
determine whether there was reciprocity with regard to provisions such as 
time-limitations in insurance contracts. Sachs J merely held that the insured 
in this case received no corresponding benefits in exchange for the time-
limitation clause329 and that the certificate of insurance wholly favoured 
the insurer without any reciprocal benefit for the insured. When invoked, 
the time limitation would wipe out a claim and not just limit or qualify it, 
thereby enabling the insurer to keep the premium. It impacted on the rela-
tionship between the insurer and insured in a manner that is not generally 
permitted in an open and democratic society.330 Moseneke DCJ found that 
there was a lack of reciprocity in this case, because there was no time-bar 
on claims by the insurer.331 But it is unlikely that the insurer will ever claim 
against the insured. Such a reciprocal restriction would therefore be of little 
practical importance. It should not be necessary or sufficient to show that an 
insurer is also subject to a time limitation. Moseneke DCJ noted also that the 
contract was not reciprocal because the power of the insurer to repudiate a 
claim was not subject to a time limitation.332 Perhaps it would help to show 
reciprocity where such a limitation is placed on the time within which an 
insurer’s repudiation has to take place.
When it comes to reasonable expectation, Sachs J observed that a reason-
able person would not have been aware that the time limitation in this form 
was in the particular contract.333 Perhaps it would have been better to ask 
326 See the question raised in para 150
327 See all the disclosures which will have to be made in terms of the General Code of Conduct for Authorized 
Financial Services Providers and Representatives 2003 issued in terms of s 15 of the Financial Advisory 
and Intermediary Services Act 37 of 2002, especially rr 3 1, 4, 5 and 7 1; the Policyholder Protection 
Rules (Long-term Insurance) 2004 issued in terms of s 62 of the Long-term Insurance Act 52 of 1998, 
particularly r 4 3; and the Policyholder Protection Rules (Short-term Insurance) 2004 issued in terms of 
s 55 of the Short-term Insurance Act 53 of 1998 r 4 3
328 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 165, 183
329 Para 147
330 Para 183  See the discussion of the judgement of Moseneke DCJ in the text next to n 346 below
331 Para 114, although his argument was not clearly related to the issue of standard-form contracts
332 Para 114
333 Para 148  See generally on the role of expectation, paras 136, 150, 165  This of course brings the public 
policy issue close to the question as to when a contract will be validly concluded  See Constantia Insurance 
Co Ltd v Compusource (Pty) Ltd 2005 4 SA 345 (SCA) and the way in which Naude & Lubbe 2005 SALJ 454 
relate the issue of standard-form contracts to the requirements for the conclusion of a valid contract  
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whether the reasonable person would have been surprised if the existence and 
import of the time-limitation had been explained to him.334 When it comes to 
a standard term, even a reasonable person often will not actually be aware or 
expect that a particular term is in a standard-form contract. Nevertheless, the 
answer to the question, if so phrased, would have remained the same in this 
case.
Normally standard-form contracts will not be set in stone. They will be 
adapted to changing circumstances. But how will the law allow flexibility 
where only terms that could be expected by a reasonable person will be 
allowed? Reasonable expectation should not necessarily depend on past 
experience. Hence a term would be reasonable as long as a reasonable con-
sumer would not be surprised by it given the circumstances. Moreover, it 
should contribute to the enforceability of a new term if the consumer is 
specifically and properly informed of it and if reciprocal benefits are pro-
vided. In this sense reciprocity, disclosure and reasonable expectation ought 
to be related.
So Sachs J thought that the time-limitation in this case was oppressive. 
yet, he ultimately did not find that all unreasonable or oppressive terms in 
standard-form contracts were inconsistent with public policy, but merely that 
a strong argument could be made out for such a conclusion.335 His appraisal 
of standard-form contracts served as a backdrop to the evaluation of this 
contract.336
6 2 4  the minority’s conclusion on the fairness of the time-limitation 
clause
Sachs J stressed that the time-limitation was a standard term but that the 
insurance policy also displayed two important further features: it involved the 
section 34 right that was specifically guaranteed in the Constitution337 and 
the contract concerned insurance which is a virtual necessity,338 has a public 
service character339 and involves relatively vulnerable individuals dealing 
with large specialist organizations that are well organized and play a major 
role in public life.340
The importance of the first feature has already been highlighted.341 On the 
second, Sachs J observed that the period of the time-limitation was consider-
ably shorter than the periods allowed in favour of public organs dealing with 
public funds. It therefore required scrutiny where such clauses were imposed 
334 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 150
335 Para 140  See also the qualifications expressed in para 185
336 Para 142  See 6 2 4 below
337 Paras 143, 150, 181, 183
338 Bhana 2007 SALJ 276-277
339 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 144  The court referred to the importance of self-regulation 
and the Ombud for Short-term Insurance; there is also an Ombud for Long-term Insurance
340 Paras 144, 183
341 See 3 above
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by large private firms that dominate the short-term insurance industry and 
unilaterally imposed these terms.342 Furthermore, it also should be high-
lighted that insured parties require further consumer protection as insurance 
assists insured parties in their hour of need and short-term insurance is also 
subject to complex and comprehensive statutory regulation.343 These points 
about relative vulnerability of insured parties are not entirely new, but are 
closely related to the standard-term analysis. Sachs J acknowledged this. 
He supported his observations about vulnerability with comments about the 
nature of standard-form terms.344
Moseneke DCJ agreed with Sachs J that the time limitation was unreason-
ably short and he stated that he would merely proffer further reasons for this 
conclusion.345 He then added some noteworthy arguments. He found that it 
would have been very difficult for the insured to comply with the time-bar, that 
he would have suffered great prejudice where the insurer relied on the provi-
sion, but that the only benefit for the insurer of the short time-limitation would 
have been that it would have become easier to escape liability. He correctly 
looked at the time-limitation from a different point of departure: what legiti-
mate purpose was achieved with this unseemly haste? Once the insured gave 
notice of the claim to the insurer, the insurer could start collecting evidence. 
The aim of the provision could not have been the preservation of evidence. 
The interest which the insurer had in the provision was disproportionate to 
that of the insured.346 The weighing of the benefits for the insurer and detri-
ments to the insured should be central to the evaluation of a time limitation. In 
this respect moseneke dCJ makes a significant contribution. The preservation 
of evidence by the insurer probably should become relevant only where time-
limitations allow for a considerably longer period within which summons has 
to be issued.347
6 2 5  the second enquiry: flexibility and reasonableness of 
enforcement
The second enquiry as phrased by the insured and derived from the Mohlomi 
case348 concerned the question whether the time-clause was void because it 
inflexibly required compliance irrespective of the circumstances confronting 
the insured. Ngcobo J noted that:
342 Paras 176, 183  See also the comprehensive analysis of Moseneke DCJ in paras 115-117
343 See especially the General Code of Conduct for Authorized Financial Services Providers and 
Representatives 2003 issued in terms of s 15 of the Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services Act 
37 of 2002; the Short-term Insurance Act 53 of 1998; and the Policyholder Protection Rules (Short-term 
Insurance) 2004 issued in terms of s 55 of the Short-term Insurance Act  See also 7 below
344 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 144-146  An accurate analysis of this issue is provided in 
Bhana 2007 SALJ 276-277  See also 6 2 3 above for a discussion of bargaining power
345 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 108
346 Paras 112-113  See also the discussion of the judgement of Sachs J in the text next to n 330 above
347 Perhaps it should be asked whether these arguments do not suggest a return to the traditional rules regard-
ing onus in restraint of trade cases  Cf the current position set out in Magna Alloys and Research (SA) 
(Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 4 SA 874 (A) and see the cases discussed in Reddy v Siemens Telecommunications 
(Pty) Ltd 2007 2 SA 486 (SCA)
348 Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 1997 1 SA 124 (CC)
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“The inquiry is not whether the clause is inflexible. The inquiry is whether in all the circumstances 
of the case, in particular, having regard to the reason for non-compliance with the clause, it would be 
contrary to public policy to enforce the clause”.349
These questions are related. If the law or the contract itself provides 
adequate mechanisms for dealing with circumstances where enforcement 
of the time-clause would be oppressive, then the clause naturally cannot be 
oppressive because of its inflexibility. It would then become necessary to 
determine whether the enforcement of the time-limitation in the particular 
circumstances is oppressive in terms of those contractual provisions or laws. 
In all other situations the inflexibility argument would remain important and 
it would be possible to hold that a time-limitation is illegal because it did 
not provide mechanisms for dealing with circumstances where enforcement 
would be oppressive, even if enforcement would not operate unfairly in the 
actual circumstances of the case.
Hence, the narrow question posed by the majority could only have arisen 
once it was accepted that the law (or the contract) contained adequate mecha-
nisms to prevent oppressive enforcement of the clause. The contract manifestly 
did not provide for these situations, and it is at least controversial whether the 
law before Napier did so adequately.350
Ngcobo J accepted that the arguments of the parties on whether the clause 
was inflexible or “enforceable regardless of how unfair or unjust this might 
be in a given case” raised difficult issues.351 He referred to two grounds for 
refusing enforcement of the time limitation in unfair circumstances. The first 
was the common law principle that a person should not be required to do 
something which is impossible: lex non cogit ad impossibilia.352 The second, 
apparently relied upon by the respondent,353 was that “the requirement of good 
faith … should be implied in this case”.354 The judge considered the state-
ment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Brisley v Drotsky355 that good faith 
is not “a self-standing rule, but an underlying value that is given expression 
through existing rules of law”.356 He then proposed that good faith could be 
utilized to develop the doctrine of impossibility357 while he asked whether the 
doctrine of impossibility would not alone be a sufficient ground for refusing 
349 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 69
350 Christie The Law of Contract (2006) 15 states that “the common law cannot yet claim to have this situa-
tion under control”
351 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 74
352 Paras 75-78 with reference to Gassner v Minister of Law and Order 1995 1 SA 322 (C) 332B-H; Mati v 
Minister of Justice, Police and Prisons, Ciskei 1988 3 SA 750 (Ck) 755-756; Minister of Law and Order v 
Maserumule 1993 4 SA 688 (T) 691G-692B; Montsisi v Minister van Polisie 1984 1 SA 619 (A) 638G-H; 
Pizani v Minister of Defence 1987 4 SA 592 (A) 602G-I
353 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 68, 79
354 Paras 79-82 with reference to Tuckers Land and Development Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Hovis 1980 1 SA 
645 (A) 651C
355 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA)
356 Para 32  Referred to in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 82  See Christie The Law of 
Contract (2006) 16 and the reference to Eerste Nasionale Bank van Suidelike Afrika Bpk v Saayman 1997 
4 SA 302 (A)  See also the text next to nn 179, 222 above
357 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 82 with reference to Hutchinson “Non-Variation Clauses 
in Contract: any Escape from the Shifren Straitjacket?” 2001 SALJ 720 743-744 (quoted with approval in 
Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) para 22)
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to enforce a contract and whether “under the Constitution, this limited role 
[the one set out in Brisley] for good faith is appropriate”.358 He even noted that 
there is a “compelling argument” for applying both the impossibility doctrine 
and the principle of good faith to time-limitation clauses.359 Yet, he concluded 
that it was not necessary to determine whether these arguments could have 
prevented enforcement of the time-limitation clause as there was no evidence 
that the insured had been treated unfairly.360
In contract law an obligation is normally invalidated for impossibility on the 
basis of the maxim impossibilium nulla obligatio est.361 The requirements for 
invalidating an obligation because performance is impossible, are strict.362 In 
the type of situation where an insured has not complied with a time-limitation 
clause, performance mostly will be subjectively impossible but the law 
traditionally requires objective impossibility for striking down an obligation.363 
It will not be easy to show that performance is impossible.364 Moreover, it 
is doubtful whether good faith, as the concept has evolved in South Africa, 
could have been utilized to transform the doctrine of impossibility to address 
the difficulties caused by subjective impossibility. The suggestion that it may 
be necessary to give wider scope to good faith in the light of the Constitution 
is more tantalizing. It is a pity that a firmer view was not expressed on the 
matter. Hopefully the debate on the role of good faith in contract law will now 
be re-opened and addressed more adequately. Perhaps it could become an 
important engine for developing public policy.365
most importantly the question remains: if the court did not take a firm view 
on these issues, would it not have been necessary to determine whether the 
clause itself was inflexible? The judgment provides an answer, albeit obliquely. 
Ngcobo J commenced this part of his judgment by apparently accepting that 
unfair circumstances would have precluded enforcement on the basis of public 
policy but that there was no factual basis for refusing enforcement on this 
ground.366 He did not clearly relate the test applied here to the one that he 
formulated for purposes of addressing the first enquiry.367 He also did not 
358 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 82
359 Para 83
360 Paras 83-86
361 Peters, Flamman and Co v Kokstad Municipality 1919 AD 427, 434-435 with reference to D 50 17 185 
and D 45 1 140 2  See the analysis of the maxims lex non cogit ad impossibilia and impossibilium nulla 
obligatio est by Van Zyl J in Gassner NO v Minister of Law and Order 1995 1 SA 322 (C) 325ff  The 
latter maxim is more apposite to contract law  The court in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) only 
mentioned the latter maxim in para 77 in a quote from Montsisi v Minister van Polisie 1984 (1) SA 619 
(A)  
362 The cases on the doctrine of impossibility to which the majority referred in the Napier case do not come 
from contract law and should be approached with considerable care
363 Bob’s Shoe Centre v Heneways Freight Services (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 SA 421 (A) 425; Yodaiken v Angehrn and 
Piel 1914 TPD 254, See also Van der Merwe et al Contract 542
364 See for example K & S Dry Cleaning Equipment (Pty) Ltd v SA Eagle Insurance Co Ltd 2001 3 SA 652 
(W)
365 See the emphasis on this issue in the judgment of Sachs J who regarded good faith as a mechanism that 
can be used to ensure fairness in contracts (Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 167)
366 Paras 72-73, 83-86  See the cautious argument in Brisley v Drotsky 2002 4 SA 1 (SCA) paras 69-73
367 The majority’s evaluation of public policy is also open to some criticism  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 
323 (CC) para 73, and see 4 above  In para 57, Ngcobo J created the impression that sanctity of contract 
only had to be considered as part of the first enquiry, but in para 73 he made it clear that it was also 
relevant under the second enquiry
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explain the link between this ground for not enforcing a contract in unfair 
circumstances and the other two grounds for doing so, that he analyzed there-
after.368 But it is suggested that this is the only interpretation that would make 
sense of this part of the judgment.369
That the majority judgment leaves room for confusion is illustrated by the 
judgment of O’Regan J. She concurred in the order granted by and the reason-
ing of Ngcobo J, subject to one reservation.370 She apparently believed that 
half of the argument concerning public policy as well as all the arguments 
concerning the application of the impossibility doctrine371 and the concept of 
good faith were redundant to the resolution of the case because there were no 
facts to show that the time-limitation clause was unreasonable. If her reser-
vation was intended to include the conclusion reached with regard to public 
policy, then her interpretation of the majority judgment renders it illogical.
Moseneke DCJ emphasized that the impugned time-bar provision did not 
provide for extension on good cause shown. It could have been enforced what-
ever the reason for the failure to comply with it. Conceivably the restraint could 
have been enforced in circumstances where it would have operated unfairly or 
unreasonably. The judge addressed the argument of the insured that there are 
remedies at common law that would ameliorate the harsh consequences of the 
clause: that the insured could have relied on the doctrine of good faith or the 
maxim that the law does not require persons to do the impossible. He correctly 
accepted that the majority did not finally decide whether any of these grounds 
applied in the circumstances. But he then concluded that
“the majority judgment does not decide whether the clause is inflexible because there are no facts to 
show why the applicant did not comply with the time limitation”.372
This summary of the majority’s view confuses the question whether the 
time-limitation was inflexible and whether it would have been unfair to allow 
enforcement. Moseneke DCJ, like O’Regan J seems to overlook the majority’s 
argument regarding the role of public policy in these situations.
Moseneke DCJ’s response to the majority’s arguments is similarly unintel-
ligible and unpersuasive.373 Again the reasons for the difficulty are twofold. 
First, the judge was reluctant to determine whether the common law could 
create the necessary flexibility for a provision, even if the provision itself did 
not. Secondly, he failed to distinguish between the question whether the clause 
could be unfairly enforced and whether it would be unfair to enforce it in the 
circumstances of the case. oddly, the approach conflicts with his stated aim to 
determine public policy objectively.374 He observed that:
368 But see text next to nn 352-354 above  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 84-85 in particular 
could be read to mean that the court did not take a firm view on whether there was any ground upon which 
enforcement could be refused
369 If the judgment of the majority could not be so interpreted, then the criticism put forward by the minority 
that it is overly subjective would apply to the second enquiry
370 Para 120
371 Paras 73-83
372 Para 118
373 Paras 118-119
374 See 6 2 2 above
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“It seems clear that the respondent’s contention that there are common law defences which could 
render the time bar clause flexible is, at best, of no practical value in this case. This argument is an 
after-thought. It was never pleaded or argued in the High Court or the Supreme Court of Appeal. It 
amounts to a belated invitation to this Court to develop the common law. In any event, the common 
law qualification that the respondent seeks to have read into the stipulation flies in the face of the 
respondent’s actual conduct, which is that the special plea is sufficient to destroy the applicant’s claim. 
In my view, the clause means what it says. If the summons is not served within 90 days of repudiation 
of the claim, the insurer is released from liability”. 375
Perhaps the judge could get away with the contention that this issue was not 
properly pleaded and argued. This is perhaps what the first part of the quota-
tion implies. But this aspect is not properly and explicitly reasoned. Moreover, 
the further point that the respondent’s conduct showed that there was no such 
limitation in this case, is unpersuasive. The insurer could have relied on the 
special plea on the assumption that enforcement would have been fair in the 
special circumstances of the case.376
Sachs J did not clearly distinguish the first and second enquiries. But in his 
final evaluation of the case, he stated that the time limitation was
“not subject to express qualifications in case of impossibility or difficulty of compliance, nor appar-
ently permissive of condonation where considerations of justice would require that its harshness be 
tempered by prolongation of the time”.377
Again this statement does not adequately address the question whether the 
law does not in any event provide adequate relief for enforcement in situations 
where it would be oppressive towards the insured to do so. The mere fact that 
the contract does not provide for these situations will not lead inexorably to 
unfairness if the law accommodates them.
Perhaps the difficulty with the second enquiry arose because the Mohlomi 
test was designed for dealing with legislative time limitations. In contract law 
the first enquiry should concern the question whether a time-limitation provi-
sion is against public policy because it is likely to be oppressive in ordinary 
circumstances.378 When it comes to the second question the law ideally should 
provide for adequate mechanisms to deal with extraordinary circumstances. If 
this were so, the second enquiry as formulated by Ngcobo J would be appropri-
ate. Would enforcement in the particular circumstances be so oppressive that 
it would preclude enforcement even though the clause itself is not oppressive? 
Questions regarding the flexibility of the clause would never arise.379
7  Conclusion
While the majority judgments in the Constitutional Court decision in 
Napier disappoint as they did not assist an insured who was confronted by a 
375 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) para 119
376 Although Sachs J did not discuss this as a separate issue, he considered it in para 183  See also the distinc-
tion between different stages of a contract that he referred to in para 170
377 Para 183
378 See 6 2 1 and 6 2 2 above
379 For situations where time-limitations have been harshly enforced, see especially K & S Dry Cleaning 
Equipment (Pty) Ltd v SA Eagle Insurance Co Ltd 2001 3 SA 652 (W) and also Union National South 
British Insurance Co Ltd v Padayachee 1985 1 SA 551 (A)  It is suggested that these cases would now be 
decided differently
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short and oppressive time limitation in a standard-form contract, the major-
ity and minority judgments bristle with suggestions for reforming traditional 
contract law in the light of the Constitution.380 The proposals for developing 
the common law of contract and insurance law should be taken seriously.
The Constitution can serve as an important engine for reform of general 
contract law and insurance law. In this process the protection of vulner-
able consumers should loom large. This perhaps is not as alluring as most 
of the other constitutional projects, but it remains of enormous practical 
importance:
“Given the scale of injustice in our past, it is not surprising that the theme of consumer protection 
has not loomed as large in this country as it has in other parts of the industrialised world. Yet just as 
the best should not be the enemy of the good, so the worst should not be the friend of the bad. As 
our society normalises itself, issues that were once relatively submerged now surface to claim full 
attention. In this way achievement of the larger constitutional freedoms enables us to attend to and 
develop the smaller freedoms so necessary for enabling ordinary people to live dignified lives in an 
open and democratic society.”381
Since the Napier dispute arose, the policyholder protection rules have 
come into being in order to promote protection of consumers in the insur-
ance industry.382 These rules prohibit time-limitation provisions of shorter 
than 90 days. If a similar case were to come before court today the main 
question would be whether the rules accord with the Constitution. The role 
of the common law in the dispute would be much reduced. Furthermore, a 
wide-ranging Consumer Protection Bill will soon become law. This statute 
will address many of the concerns about the weak protection which the law 
currently affords consumers (although it will not apply to insurance transac-
tions). After Napier it is impossible to argue that there is not a need for such 
legislation. It accordingly may be suggested that the Napier case will soon be 
of little practical relevance. However, it is proposed that the opposite is true. 
It is necessary that these legislative reforms should be accommodated within 
a general contract law and insurance law that are in harmony with it. These 
fundamental statutory reforms cannot be treated as exceptions to general and 
traditional contract law or insurance law. The Constitution is central to the 
creation of such a harmony.
SUMMARY
Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) has important implications for insurance law, contract 
law in general, and an understanding of the interface between private common law and the Bill of 
Rights. In this matter an insurance policy determined that a claim against the insurer would lapse if 
the insured failed to serve summons on the insurer within 90 days of being notified of the insurer’s 
repudiation of the claim. The insured argued that this provision conflicted with the constitutional right 
of access to the courts set out in section 34 of the Bill of Rights
The majority of the Constitutional Court, per Ngcobo J, considered the application of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 in private relationships. He eschewed direct 
application of the Bill of Rights to the contractual provision but preferred to apply it indirectly via 
380 Although even Sachs J remained conscious of the status of the Supreme Court of Appeal as developer of 
the common law  See Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) paras 178-179
381 Para 184
382 See n 74 above
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the contract law concept of public policy. He considered the meaning of this form of public policy in 
the light of the Constitution, determined the manner in which the section 34 right as an expression 
of public policy applied to this contract and related this to broader contractual fairness. Part I of this 
article, which appeared in 2008 (3) Stellenbosch Law Review, focused on these aspects.
The majority further considered the significance of the sanctity of contract under the Constitution 
and decided that it could only uphold the time-limitation clause if it was fair. Its test for determining 
fairness was derived from cases that determined whether statutory provisions were inconsistent with 
section 34. They upheld the clause on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to show that the 
provision was unreasonable or that it would be unreasonable to enforce it in the circumstances. Part II 
is dedicated to an analysis of these issues.
The majority judgment is analyzed with reference to the trenchant criticism in the minority judg-
ments of Sachs J and Moseneke DCJ, delivered in the same court, as well as the earlier judgments of 
the Transvaal Provincial Decision and Supreme Court of Appeal. Ultimately the majority judgment in 
the Constitutional Court is criticized for being too timid and in some respect unsystematic. However, 
the final conclusion is positive. These judgments can serve as a springboard for the development of a 
progressive contract law, built on the values and rights set out in the Constitution.
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